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sex, national origin, handicap,EVENTS AND IDEAS LEADING TO THE DEVELOPMENT DECADE OF THE 1960s:
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE UNDER EISENHOWER AND KENNEDY
This paper is  an effort  to examine the  trends in political and
professional  thinking which led up to the  launching of the  "development
decade" of the  1960s.  In 1961, President Kennedy took office, ushering
in a new era of assistance  for the economic development of developing
countries.  He consolidated aid programs  into one new organization, the
Agency for International Development; he christened the Peace Corps  and
the Alliance for Progress.  Foreign aid appropriations  increased
substantially, and Congress passed a multiyear aid authorization.  The
United States became a member of the OECD that year. The most noted
feature of the new program, however, would be  its  emphasis  on the  long
run economic development of the recipient nations rather than on short
term security concerns.
These  foreign aid initiatives were more  the culmination of a decade
of political and academic thinking  than the beginning of a new aid
philosophy.  The New York Times of June 4, 1961 editorialized, "it
should be noted at  the outset that the overhaul  (of the foreign aid
program) is  not quite so drastic as  the headlines suggested...In short,
the Kennedy Administration has re-embraced the concept on which the old
Point Four program was based."  This paper picks up where Point Four
left off.
In seeking out  the  driving forces behind the evolution of the
economic  aid program, we separately examine  the following motivations:security considerations,  economic self interest, and humanitarian
concerns.  We do  this by looking primarily at congressional  testimony
where we find that  the arguments  for aid were overwhelmingly centered on
the  security concern.
As fear of the  spread of communism grew, so did interest  in the
foreign aid program. The U.S. program expanded largely as a response to
a growing Soviet aid program and to a fear that the desperate masses of
many developing countries would turn to the Soviet camp for relief from
their poverty.  This  fear may have reached a height in 1960-61 when all
doubt was  removed that Cuba  (just 90 miles  from U.S. mainland) was in
the  communist  camp.
While the economic contest between communism and capitalism became a
major component of the Cold War, the  importance of the Third World
countries  to the  general well being of the United States became
increasingly evident, even outside the  context of the Cold War. The
developing countries' prosperity and stability would be  important to
that of the United States.  Commerce with them would be important  for
the  supply of goods  (both stategic and non) to  the United States.
The aid program received further support from labor, business and
agriculture lobbies.  Money spent on aid was often viewed as  a jobs
program from which many workers and employers could benefit.  These
groups tended to be less  interested in helping other countries  develop
than in being hired in the process.  They did not seem to  initiate the
expansion of aid, but rather lobbied for  it once  it was  on the table.
Certainly there were many who were opposed to aid because of its
inevitable impact on taxes. There was also considerable controversy
2concerning the net effect of newly developed countries becoming
competition as well as markets  for U.S. goods.  Economic  interests were
often advanced as  security measures by the basic concept  that a strong
domestic economy is  critical  to  the defense of the country.
Many church and volunteer organizations supported aid for
humanitarian purposes, and their politically active members  added
strength to  the pro-aid lobby. In terms of political debate, however,
the humanitarian issue could only be regarded as a sideshow. The much
used phrase,  "We cannot live  on an island of wealth in a sea of poverty"
had a ring of humanitarianism about it, but when pressed for an
elaboration, the enunciator of such words would generally admit that our
island of wealth was  indefensible  (rather than just morally untenable).
In reviewing academic literature  from 1952-1961 we see  that as short-
term security concerns were paramount, capital  intensive,  "big push"
type  theories dominated the literatute.f  As dollar allocations reached a
peak in 1961,  disappointments  in the aiLd program's  results were
accompanied by a return to emphasis on long term social and political
reform in the  development process.  The  "big push" approach seemed to
garner  the most academic support at approximately the  time that the
administration was  still hopeful of  its shorter  term heavily
politicized aid programs.
This examination of development assistance thought essentially
follows  a debate  in which the question of "does  the economic advancement
of less  developed countries serve the U.S.  interests?"  received
relatively scant attention. An answer of "yes" was generally given,
3though the  debate would flare  in deciding at what cost to  the U.S.
taxpayers. Domestic industries which could envision direct competition
from the developing countries understandably qualified those  "yes"
answers. The other dominant question was,  "How can we  facilitate this
development  if it  is in our interest?"  The 1961 aid program was
Congress's answer to  that question after more than five years of active
debate.
This paper concerns U.S.  aid and does  not specifically address
multilateral programs.  It considers  economic and supporting assistance
in particular and does not attempt  to  discuss aid that  is not
development related. This latter distinction is  seldom clear, however,
as  specific aid programs were often given the dual mission of long term
development and short term security purposes.  Lastly, the paper does
not attempt to  evaluate an evolving program, rather it attempts to
identify the  forces behind that evolution.
SECURITY CONCERNS IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE
1952-1961
In the period from 1952  to  1961,  the  security objective of
development assistance was by far  the most compelling when compared with
humanitarian and economic objectives.  The expansion of the aid program
leading up  to and including the 1961  initiatives paralleled an increase
in the perceived security threat of spreading communism. Aid was
intended as a weapon to  address that threat. This section of the paperexamines  the  evolution of the aid program during  this period from a
security perspective.
The Development Assistance Program is Annexed by the Security Effort:
1952-1954
Economic aid (as embodied in the Marshall Plan) was scheduled to be
phased out in  1952. The plan, however, was  extended.  Mutual Security
Administration  (MSA)  Director Averell Harriman explained that it was  the
2
start of the Korean War which prevented the plan's  earlier demise.  The
MSA had been created in 1951, bringing military and economic  aid under
one umbrella organization which increasingly saw its  mission as a
relatively short term one of containing communism in countries  on the
periphery of the Eurasian communist block.  The use of development aid
as  a short term security measure and the  simultaneous attempt to  reduce
its  expense dominated the  aid program through the mid 1950s.
The distinction between military and economic aid became very clouded
after the Korean War began.  General Eisenhower's representative,
General Guenther, noted in 1952  that "the economic and military aspects
4
of defense...defy separation  (in modern warfare)."  The demise of
development assistance was forestalled by its use  in the  security
arsenal, though its usefulness, combined with the perceived security
threat at  that time, was not convincing enough to prevent the  overall
reduction in foreign aid spending.  While the  original  intentions of
technical and other  long term assistance programs had their advocates,
the  future of the aid program was assured primarily by the  security
lobby of the administration and Congress.
5A growing conservatism was formalized in 1953, when General
Eisenhower became president and the Republicans won slight majorities in
both houses of Congress.  The conservative ideology was  supportive of
the policy of containing communism with a ring of military alliances,
nuclear deterrence, and the  strengthening of foreign forces  in strategic
areas.  Neutral countries  in the cold war were regarded negatively.
Budgetary constraint was paramount, and any economic development of less
developed countries was  thought to be best handled by the private
sector.  Eisenhower's  final MSA budget request for fiscal year 1954 was
$5.5 billion, down from Truman's  $7.6  billion request  for  the same
period. Secretary of State Dulles described the budget reduction as  the
maximum which could be  "reconciled with the essential security of the
U.S." 6
Harold Stassen began his  two year directorship of the  foreign aid
program in 1953 with the awkward position of having to  carry out the
dismantlement of the program at  the same  time  that he was warning the
Senate Appropriations Committee  that the U.S. would have to continue
giving aid to free nations for  the ten years that he expected the Soviet
threat to  last.  When asked to discuss  the administration's $2 billion
cut from Truman's aid budget request  in this light, Stassen said, "We
are seeking more defense, more rapidly, with less  dollars,  lasting
l8
longer."
There was  a growing recognition of threats  to U.S. security in the
Asia theater.  House Appropriations  Committee Chairman John Taber  (R.
NY) said that recent events on the international  scene demonstrated the
need for  the U.S.  to  "do  whatever we can to build up support  for the
6defense  of the Far East, Southeast Asia, and the Western Pacific."
Senator Styles Bridges,  appeared to  have revised his  attitude when he
spoke in support of the  foreign aid bill saying it would "assist our
Free World partners to raise and support the  forces required for
collective defense."1  Senator George  (D.  GA) announced a revision in
his outlook (which had been for sharp cuts in aid) "in view of the
conditions existing in the world."1 '
The situation in Indo-China was getting particularly tense as
communism made  gains  there.  India became a special concern as  Stassen
warned that cutting of aid to  India would "make it more likely that  the
Communists would take over that  country."12  The  "loss"  of the world's
largest democracy (India) to Communism was regarded by many as
unacceptable, especially given Communist China's apparent economic
success.
Congress was continuing its effort to phase out the  development aid
program,  but  at  the  same  time  it  was  appreciating  aid's  value  as  a
partial response  to the problem of communist expansionism in Asia.
Criticism became focussed more on the administration of aid than on its
existence.  A February 6, 1954,  staff report  to the Senate
Appropriations Committee noted that technical assistance was losing  its
identity  in the program of large scale  grants for economic assistance.
It  said that poor use of funds  indicated that funding cutbacks could be
endured without resultant reductions  in activity.1 3
Stassen hinted acknowledgement that  the administration had been
preoccupied with military (over economic)  solutions to world tensions
when he  said that "on the basis of  the ending of the hostilities in
7...(Korea and Indo-China)...you will  find that the administration is
moving more extensively in the economic and ideological and technical
14
field in this  part of the world."  He also announced increased support
of free labor union activity in developing countries  as  the communists
were moving in on the  labor side  as  the countries developed.
Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman, Alexander Wiley, (R. WI)
described foreign aid in positive  terms  as  "probably the single most
anti-communist program,"  and at  the same time he took pride in the  great
budget reductions made  in the program.5
The Cold War Heats Up on the Economic Front:  1955-1957:  The U.S. Turns
to Long Term Development Assistance Policy.
Initiatives by the Soviet Union on the  economic aid front had a
profound effect on U.S. policy. One of these initiatives was a 1955  tour
of Asia by Premier Nikolai A. Bulgantn and Communist Party Head, Nikita
Krushchev.  Their visit  included India,. Burma, and Afghanistan, and
resulted in an offer of Soviet technical assistance  in the  construction
of a steel mill in India among other projects.  In response  to Western
critics, Krushchev challenged, "perhaps you wish to compete with us  in
establishing friendship with the Indians?  Let us compete."1   Soviet
economic assistance was regarded as  increasing sharply in the name of
economic development programs  ,  and there was a popular belief that
18
Soviet aid had fewer strings attached to  it  than did U.S.  aid.  U.S.
policy makers took the Soviet challenge to heart but were very uncertain
of where else to  take  it.
8The economic aid contest with the Soviet Union began to dominate U.S.
foreign policy.  Dulles, himself, seemed to accept this new cold war
philosophy when he said in 1956  that Soviet tactics now have "more guile
19 and less  force....the  second round is  now beginning."9  The
administration stopped its trend of aid cuts, citing "immediate  threats
20 to security and stability...now centered in Asia."  Dulles asserted
that foreign aid was  an "essential part of our overall foreign policy,"
21 needed to persuade the Communists  that "world conquest is  futile," 21  and
that Communism was  "pressing hard;"  (the aid program would be)  "needed
22 for a considerable period of time,"  he said.22  Stassen gave the  often
used argument that military aid would "obtain more defense  for  the U.S."
23 than the same amount spent on U.S. military forces.2  Former U.S. High
commissioner in Germany, John McCloy, issued a report saying that even
with military superiority we could  "lose the struggle  for freedom".  He
specifically stated that we must address the U.S.S.R.'s economic,
social, and political challenge.24
This apparent reversal  on the part of the Administration added to  the
confusion over  foreign aid in Congress.  Dulles was criticized not only
for  these  apparent contradictions, but  also for oversimplifying and
25 underestimating  the Soviet strategy  in international affairs.  Aid
activists criticized the lack of coordination and comprehensiveness  in
26
the  aid program.  Senator Russell Long  (D. LA) noted that "there  is  no
war going on"  in his call for  the gradual reduction of economic and
27
military aid.  Senator George Malone  (R, Nev) observed the  then annual
trend to  "give away more millions,"  complaining that "we hardly
understand what the  legislation is about."  However, Representative
9Mathews may have summed up the mood of Congress when he  acknowledged his
misgiving about aid and said, "If someone were  to  say to me:  You are
voting for a giveaway program to foreign nations, I would say...It  is  a
gamble with money rather than with the precious  lives of our boys."2 9
The Foreign Relations Committee now headed by Sen. George  (D.,GA) went
on record in  support of aid saying that its continuation was essential
to  free world security.3
The containment of Soviet  influence was seen to require more than
strategic defense pacts on the communist periphery.  A sharing of
economic largesse would be an increasingly important weapon in
preventing alliances between the Soviet Union and developing countries.
Thus, economic assistance was becoming a regular feature of the overall
security package of the U.S. but there was confusion as to what its
exact role would be.
In his  1956 State of the Union Message, Eisenhower asked Congress for
limited authority to  make longer term commitments on aid projects in
order to  give "assurance of continuity in economic assistance"
31
programs.  Noting that a similar program was suggested by Stassen one
and one half years earlier, only to be overruled by the State
Department, a questioner asked Dulles  if the  State Department had
changed it position.  Dulles  surprisingly replied  "no, the  State
Department has been in favor of something of this sort for some  time."32
Lacking confidence  in the State Department, Congress  showed bipartisan
opposition to  the long term funding proposal, and the proposal was not
pressed ahead.  Senator George  said, "I honestly don't know how or why
this  long term commitment business arose."3 3
10Amidst  the confusion over the direction of the aid program,
Eisenhower announced on May 4, 1956,  his  intentions of forming a
commission with Congress  to study the  issue.  Ultimately six different
administration and Congressional  studies were conducted, but the  1956
Mutual Security Act became something of a stop-gap measure pending their
findings.  Congress's  final aid appropriation was  ('as  usual) less  than
the President's request, but it was more  than  $1 billion greater  than
the previous year's appropriation.
The President's Citizens Advisers on the Mutual Security Program
(the Fairless Commission) concluded that economic development should be
continued as  a long range endeavour and that Congressional funding
approval should be on a two year rather than a one year basis.  The
assistance program was considered one of  "collective security."
On July 7, 1956,  the  Senate formed a special committee to study
foreign aid.  It consisted of the members of the  foreign relations
committee and the Chairmen and ranking minority members of the
Appropriations  and Armed Services Committees.  The report recommended a
continuation of foreign aid and called for clear distinctions  to be made
between military, technical and development assistance.  It called for
a revolving fund for development loans, cautioning that it should not be
"set up in haste."  Repayable loans were  to be emphasized over grants.
Despite the  conclusion that technical assistance  "would serve our
interests for many years  to  come,"  it should be  subject to annual
authorization review for at  least two or  three years,  the report said.
Efforts  to reduce military and supporting aid were  called for.  Military
aid should be  administered by the Department of Defense with policy
11direction by the Secretary of State.  Foreign aid policies  and other
activities abroad should be better coordinated by the President and
Senate, while private contractors, universities, and personnel from
other government departments should be used where possible in carrying
out the work of the program.  Major witnesses before the committee
included H. Christian Sonne  (Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the
National Planning Association) calling for a five year economic
development program, based primarily on loans, and Max D. Millikan
(Director of the Center  for International  Studies at MIT) warning that
abandonment of the aid program would cause underdeveloped countries to
turn "increasingly to  the Soviet bloc."  He  recommended a ten year, ten
billion dollar program of economic aid, of which 80%  would be loans.
A draft report of the Foreign Affairs Committee Report was  issued on
December 23,  1956,  calling for a reduction, rather than an increase, in
foreign aid with nonmilitary aid based primarily on  loans.  It said
that Countries receiving Soviet aid should be eligible  to also receive
U.S.  aid.  The report concluded that "foreign aid appears  to be  the most
useful nonmilitary device available to  the United States for influencing
other nations."
In another study, the  International Development Advisory Board called
for a fund to put the program of economic development on a flexible and
long-term basis, with Congressional funding for periods  of at least
three years.
As  these study reports were coming in, another factor arose in the
Soviet-U.S. contest to show the developing world which system
12(capitalist or  free market) showed the greater promise:  the  Soviet
success  in putting  into orbit the  first manmade satellite, Sputnik.
The Long Term Approach to Development Assistance  is  institutionalized:
1958-1960
A conference (initiated by President Eisenhower) to promote  the
importance of development assistance was held in February, 1958.'  One of
the  speakers was  former President Truman who said,  "The only thing we
can do with armaments  is  to buy time.  One of our best hopes  (for
obtaining peace)  is  economic assistance  for other nations."34
Eisenhower's  support of economic development aid, however, was  still in
a  formative  stage.
In 1958,  the  trend toward assistance  in long term development began
to be put  into action.  The first loan from the Development Loan Fund
was  announced for India's Five Year  Plian.  More importantly,
Undersecretary of State Dillon announced support for an Inter-American
35
Bank in a reversal of long standing U.S. policy.  That overture to
Latin America was certainly given inspiration by Richard Nixon's
disastrous Spring  tour of South America during which he was assaulted by
angry mobs. Rising concerns  over unemployment, the  federal deficit and
the balance of payments prevented significant  increases in  the aid
36
budget however.  The International Development Association was
endorsed and passed by the  Senate  as a soft loan division of the World
Bank. 3 7
The year 1959 began with the New Years Eve victory of the Cuban
revolution led by Fidel Castro.  With unusual unanimity, the
13administration and Congress approved U.S. participation in the  new
Inter-American Development Bank.  Responding to concern that India might
choose  a future under communism, the Senate passed (with administration
endorsement) the Kennedy-Cooper Resolution for long term development
assistance  in South Asia.  Senator Kennedy argued that  1959 must be  "our
round"  after the communist "round" of 1958  in which Communist China
38
exhibited a more attractive program than the U.S.  did.3  In an open
letter to the  President, Senator Mansfield observed that "we are now at
the beginning of a shift back to  an era of economic emphasis." 39
The President's Draper Committee issued its report  in 1959, making
several suggestions  for improvements which included calls for  a single
agency to administer the program, long range  (rather than year-to-year)
financing of the Development Loan Fund, and increased emphasis on
self-help efforts by the aid recipients as  a condition of the aid.4 0
Representative Charles Brown (D. MO) called for  long- term development
assistance saying,"  We should strive  to prevent trouble rather than wait
until trouble is  fomented and then try to bribe our way out"4 1
Undersecretary of State Dillon said that another year would be needed to
observe  the program and that a longer range program would be requested
for fiscal year 1961.42  Later in 1960,  the Act of Bogota was
initiated by the administration and passed by Congress  as the  first
effort in what would later be dubbed the Alliance for Progress.  The Act
signalled the new direction which the program was  taking by its  emphasis
on the  social aspects of reform in the developing countries.  A House
Foreign Affairs Committee Special Study Mission reported that there was
a  "strikingly dangerous  gap between such grandiose projects at the  top
14S43
and  the millions  of human beings still  starving."4 3  One of the
responses  to  that finding was  that Congress  directed the president to
consider  instituting a "Point Four Youth Corps,"  a concept similar to
that embodied in  the Peace Corps  the following year.
Aid's bipartisan support was still primarily derived from perceived
security threats.  Vice President Nixon said that "recent events"
mandated the  "absolute need for keeping our mutual security operating at
44
an efficient level."  Twenty eight House Democrats wrote to  President
Eisenhower expressing criticism of his handling of foreign policy but
promising to  resist  "unwise cuts"  in the Mutual Security appropriation
because  they viewed it as  an "indispensable part of our foreign
45 policy."4  By 1960,  economic aid was a permanent fixture of foreign
. 46
policy  .
A Culmination in the  Development Assistance Trends  - 1961
1961 was a landmark year in that much of the aid philosophy which had
been evolving in  the preceding years was  formalized in law.  The
administration of the program was overhauled as Congress authorized
further separation of economic from military aid, and the  economic
program was  centralized in a new Agency for  International Development.
Congress advanced several more  steps  in the direction of long term
commitments by giving the Development Loan Fund a five year
authorization, if not appropriation.  The Act of Bogota was dressed up
and given permanence as  the Alliance for Progress. The dollars
authorized and appropriated for economic development assistance reached
a post-Marshall Plan high.  The U.S.  ratified the convention
15establishing the OECD, and the Peace Corps was  established as a
permanent organization. The tone of the  aid rhetoric picked up  in volume
from both security and humanitarian perspectives.
Kennedy often referred to  the  security threat which his aid program
was  intended to address.  During the Berlin crisis he  said that  the
"Soviet threat  is worldwide...We  face a challenge in Berlin, but there
is  also...a challenge  in Southeast Asia...in our own hemisphere and
47 whereever else the  freedom of human beings is  at stake." 47  In appeal
for support for his aid program, he said that it involved "very
importantly the  security" of the U.S. and deserved the backing "of every
American who recognizes the real nature  of the  struggle  in which we are
engaged."48
Amassador Adlai Stevenson said that,  "aid and strong argument would
49
be needed to reverse Latin American support  for Castro."9  Secretary of
State  Dean Rusk warned that the  "Western world must recapture  the
leadership of the  revolution of political freedom  ... and not yield its
leadership  to those who would seize  it and use  it to destroy us.."50
Defense Secretary Roberts S. McNamara described military and economic
aid as complimentary  (a message heard several times  in the Eisenhower
administration).51
By 1961,  it was evident that Cuba's new revolutionary government was
clearly "in the  enemy camp,"  and this a mere  90 miles from the U.S.
mainland.  Che Guevara promised to not "export revolution" to  other
American countries  if Cuba received a pledge of  "non-intervention to go
52
ahead with our work."  His words were likely heard as more of a  threat
than a comfort. Soviet Premier Khrushchev proclaimed that the Soviet
16Union was  about to  "touch the heels"  of the U.S.  (economically) and
53 "other peoples will follow...our example."  President of Pakistan,
Ayub Khan addressed a joint session of Congress  in an appeal  for passage
of Kennedy's aid program.  He said, "unless Pakistan is  able  to meet  the
economic needs of  its people,  in another 15-20 years, we  shall be
overtaken by communism...If we go under communism, then we shall  still
press against you, but not as  friends." 5   Eliminating any doubt that
security was a most pressing issue  in 1961, Kennedy advised that "any
prudent family"  should provide itself with a fallout shelter.55
Much of the congressional debate  in 1961 concerned the president's
request for long-term financing of development loans.  He asked for five
years  of Treasury borrowing authority with a provision that the eventual
loan repayments be fed into a fund for future loans.  The main objection
to this was  that  it would enable future expenditures without
Congressional  appropriation, a device  labeled "backdoor spending."  A
lesser objection was that assurance of continued aid would reduce the
recipients'  incentives to help themselves.5  The law which was actually
enacted provided for a five year authorization with annual
appropriations.  It was an approach endorsed by New York Governor Nelson
Rockefeller and former Vice President Nixon. Kennedy called it "wholey
satisfactory."5
The inertia of the previous  few years' Congressional  thinking
combined with suitably negative world circumstances  to make 1961  a big
year in development assistance history.  Another  important factor was  a
very determined president.  Representative Passman  (D. LA) described
Kennedy's efforts as  "absolutely unprecedented" in his  (Passman's)
17fifteen years  in Congress.  In addition to strong testimony by Secretary
of the Treasury Dillon and Secretary of State Rusk, Peace Corps Director
Shriver personally visited every Congressional  office in support of the
aid program. The Citizens  Committee for  International Development was
organized to exert more pressure, and the White House contacted
businessmen nationwide  to exert further pressure. Passman also reported
of patronage threats used in the  campaign.58
The centerpiece of the  1961 economic assistance program was the
Foreign Assistance Act (Senate Bill 1983,  PL 87-195),  which was passed
by a vote of 69-24 in the  Senate and 260-132  in the House.  Intended as
a bold new initiative and as  an answer  to many of the charges  of poor
administration of the aid program, the Act was passed only after
consdiderable  debate.
As in the past, the matter of attaching strings  to aid was especially
troublesome.  Secretary of State  Rusk-remarked that recipients would not
be pressed into  indicating alliances or:special committments to  the
U.S.,  however, aid would be conditional  on the adequacy of their
59
performance in the process of development.5  When Senator Capehart (R.
IN)  asked if we would "have no concern whether a country that we help
goes  communistic,"  Rusk replied negatively, saying, "we affirm the world
of choice...and I "know of "no country which has on its own volition, by
60
the vote of its people, deliberately accepted a communist regime."
Senator Fulbright asked Frank M. Coffin, of the Presidents Task Force
on Economic'  Assistance why we give continued aid to Haiti, perpetuating
the  "highly unsatisfactory regime"  there.  Coffin's  response was  "for
the short run we face  the alternative  of giving up Haiti and having
18another  instance where elements that  are against  the philosophy which we
61
all believe  in take  over.  This  is  too big a risk."  Senator Morse  (D.
OR) later said,  "we should not be  in a position of preventing revolution
if that was  the will  of the people."2  Senator Humphrey questioned the
whole premise of aid's role  in the  structural reform of the recipient.
Regarding Iran, he  said, "I have a hard time bringing myself to a
sincere belief that those  aristocrats of their area who have lived on
privilege, and who are literally wallowing in luxury, are  going to
design a program of self-destruction."6 3
Regardless of whether the aid program would be successful or not,
there seemed to be a consensus  that the economic development of less
developed countries would help forestall  the expansion of communism.
Senator Capehart said it  in almost those words64 ,  and Lloyd Neidlinger,
Executive Director of the U.S.  Council, International Chamber of
Commerce, said "a strong private economy  is  a powerful assurance  against
the possibility of Communist domination or  influence."65  A variation on
that theme was  offered by Jerry Voorhis, Executive Director of The
Cooperative League of the U.S.,  entered into testimony an article which
said, "the only major rebuffs Italian communist suffered in the last
election were where democratic cooperatives  are strong."66
After a summer of lively debate,  there were probably no Congressmen
convinced that  the foreign economic assistance problem was  solved, but
the new aid program did pass, and with more money behind it than at
anytime  since the Marshall Plan. Senator Humphrey may have spoken for a
good many of his  colleagues when he  said:  "As far as  I am concerned I am
19probably going to  support the  foreign aid program.  However, I do it
just like I go  to see  the dentist;  I am just not happy about  it."67
DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE AND ECONOMIC  SELF INTEREST
Economic self-interest arguments did not provide the  impetus  for the
aid program, but they did contribute importantly to  the program's base
of support.  When the aid program was passed in 1961,  the  sentiments
shared in testimony by representatives of business,  labor and
agriculture were little changed from those expressed in the previous  few
years.
It  is perhaps obvious  that economic self-interest concerns  are not
entirely distinct from security ones.  On the one hand a strong U.S.
economy is  arguably the best defense on the security front.  On the
other hand, economically strong allies can be viewed as being superior
allies  in the respect of security.  In this  section we are trying to
address  the economic self-interest aspect of aid, divorced from the
security question as much as possible.
The Agriculture Position
Throughout the period under consideration, there was general  support
in the  agriculture sector for an economic aid program.  In 1952,  the
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National Farmers Union advocated increased aid.  Agricultural products
stored by the Federal Government under the  farm support program had been
used previously for famine relief  (such as  in India in  1951),  and in
201953 Congress passed a law authorizing the  President to use up to  $100
million worth of surplus farm products for  relief abroad.  Also that
year, the Mutual Security Act specified that between $100 and $250
million of foreign aid funds were to be used for purchase of U.S. farm
goods.
Most  importantly, a bill was introduced  in the  Senate that year for a
foreign aid/surplus disposal program that ultimately was enacted as
Public Law 480  (PL 480) in July of 1954.  PL 480 was initially a three
year program which authorized the president to sell up to $700 million
of agricultural  surplus  to friendly nations  for foreign currencies.  The
foreign currencies acquired would be primarily directed to develop new
foreign markets  for US agriculture,  to purchase materials needed for
national security, and to make  loans  to promote multilateral trade  and
economic development.  The Act also authorized $300 million of surplus
donations  for needy people  in friendly countries  or "friendly but needy
populations without regard to  the friendliness of their government."
With a Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) stock pile  of $5.5 billion
of surplus commodities,  the program was designed to dispose  of some of
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the surplus  and to promote foreign trade  in farm products  . The bill
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was generally supported-by farm organizations  , though  the National
Council of Farmer Cooperatives warned that the price support program had
enabled,  other countries  to  "undersell and absorb our foreign markets,"
and that  the US  should emphasize private industry rather  than state
trading.
Proponents  saw the program primarily as a  specific market  expansion
program which would alleviate  the CCC's surplus problem.  Any impact on
21development abroad was  secondary.  The  fear of creating foreign
competition was a consideration when the wording of the  law was changed
so  that, rather  than using the  foreign currencies  to encourage
"production" (in the recipient countries),  they would be used to promote
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"economic development and trade."72   Some of the Congressmen thought it
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was  a  wasteful giveaway program  and some saw it as a goodwill program
74
to  fight communism7
The PL 480 program expanded, and in 1958  it was continued for an
additional eighteen months with a $6.25 billion appropriation.  Also
that year, the Administration's  Davis Committee recommended putting the
program on a 5 year basis and calling it  "Food for  Peace."  The
Committee also emphasized the program's use as a foreign policy tool
with a stated goal of helping recipients  to become independent of
foreign aid. Nevertheless,  the program was widely recognized by the
State Department, as well as by most other observers, as  a surplus
disposal program.75  PL 480 had become a very important agricultural
program accounting for 27%  of all wheat exports,  22%  of all cotton
exports, and 47%  of all vegetable oil exports in  1956.76
As concerns  the Mutual Security Act, the American Farm Bureau
Federation consistently  supported the program but often called for cuts
in  the expenditures.  The National Farmers Union supported the
administration's program and called for  increased technical aid in
77
1959.  There  is no discernable  shift in the agriculture lobby's
position on aid between 1952 and 1961.  Their Congressional  testimony
did not expound on the pros or cons  of helping other countries  to
develop.
22Organized  Labor
Organized labor consistently supported a foreign economic assistance
program throughout the  time period under consideration.  In 1953,  the
AFL testified in favor of a two year extension of the aid program and an
expanded Point Four Program.  The AFL also called for encouragement of
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labor unions  and international competition.  The Mutual Security Act
that year did make  it a policy to encourage other countries to
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strengthen free trade unions.
In 1956, AFL-CIO President George Meany said, "labor will support a
program of substantial military and economic aid to other  free nations
80
to protect  them from being forced to yield to communism."8  Both the
AFL-CIO and the UAW were members of the Point Four Information Service
which held conferences  in 1952,  1955, and 1956  to promote  foreign
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economic assistance.
The UAW and AFL-CIO also advocated anexpansion of the Development
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Loan Fund in 1959.8  In 1960  the AFL-CIO's legislative director, Andrew
J. Biemiller  (formerly a Congressman, D. WI)  joined with others calling
for  long term aid committments when he urged that the  Development Loan
Fund be put on a "strong continuing basis" with at  least $1 billion for
fiscal year 1960.  He further called for no cuts  in the Mutual Security
Program.83
The AFL-CIO's Biemiller gave  a strong endorsement of the Foreign Aid
bill in 1961.  In Foreign Affairs Committee testimony he  said that labor
supported the aid program because of the  threat of communism and because
"it  is  right"  (apparently in some moral respect).  Then he went on to
23describe  its benefits for  labor.  "(Labor has) a tremendous  interest in
the  foreign market.  If we were to  cut off foreign trade, then you would
really have an unemployment problem in the United States."  Unemployment
would "probably amount to a couple hundred thousand more"  if not for the
aid program.8  Beimiller agreed with a comment by Rep. Barry that "from
the  standpoint of jobs,  there are more jobs created by our entire
foreign aid program than there are  lost by the  imports we receive."  His
rationale was in part that  "cheap labor is not as productive as American
labor,  on  comparable  jobs." 8 5
Victor Reuther testified as  the Assistant to  the President  of the
Industrial Union Department of the AFL-CIO, his  department representing
7 million members.  He agreed that foreign aid programs generated jobs.
"With 5.5 million (Americans) unemployed," he  said, "it  takes a
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deliberate policy to  invest."  Representative Morgan was especially
concerned that the aid program was creating an ability for other
countries  to compete with the US, with resulting loss  of U.S. jobs.
Beiemiller acknowledged the  concern and said that his union had proposed
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an international minimum wage.8  Reuther said, "we have introduced, I
think to a large extent on the  initiative of American trade unions,  the
whole concept of the escalator clause, the protection against inflation,
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of an automatic adjustment to reflect the  increase  in productivity."
The unions appeared to view the aid program as a jobs program for  their
members.  Additionally they felt that  it was building up new markets
faster than it was promoting new competition.
Organized labor also had a direct stake in the aid program through
its  involvement with programs  such as  the American Institute of Free
24Labor Development, which received appropriations to  facilitate
noncommunist trade union organization in developing countries.
Business Interests
The shipping industry has  long been a beneficiary of aid.  The Mutual
Security Act of 1953  specified that at  least 50%  of commodity tonnage
shipped abroad as  aid had to be shipped on U.S. flag vessels.  When PL
480 was initiated in 1954,  the  same rule applied to  shipments on that
program.  Despite  the  fact that  a number of members  of the  Foreign
Affairs Committee argued that a shipping subsidy should be handled
someplace other  than in a foreign aid bill, Rep. Thor Tollefson  (R. WA)
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won the ammendment.  It was  later repealed in 1955. The mining
industry was succesful  in having a provision eliminated from the bill
which authorized the President to encourage production of strategic
materials  in friendly nations.  This was an ammendment sponsored by Sen.
George Malone  (R. Nev)90
Industry had mixed feelings on the  subject of development assistance.
The National Foreign Trade Council  "was strongly opposed" to  the
diversion of public funds  (intended for technical assistance)  to the
direct promotion of industrial development of underdeveloped
91
countries.  At the  same  time Ford Motor Company President Henry Ford
II  and James T. Duce, President of the Arabian-American Oil Co, both
gave  favorable testimony  for foreign aid in general and technical
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assistance  in particular.  Then, in 1956,  80%  of 100,000 independent
businessmen polled reportedly said they were opposed to  the continuance
of foreign aid "as  a permanent feature  of our nation's  foreign
2593 policy."93  In 1957, J.Peter Grace, President of W.R. Grace  and Company,
recommended loans,  investments and technical assistance  to Latin
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America, an area  in which his company had interests.
In the  1958 congressional debate several Congressmen voiced concern
that the  aid program was setting up competition against American
business.  Rep Gordon Canfield  (R.  NJ) sought unsuccessfully to prohibit
use of aid funds  to establish textile-processing plants  in any foreign
country, and Rep. Robert Griffin (R.  MI) moved to prohibit funds  for the
establishment of any kind of plant which might compete with US
industries. Both motions were rejected, but Rep. George Anderson (D  AL)
warned that "...these  programs will wreck the economy of our
"95 country... "
The Chamber of Commerce of the US was generally supportive of aid,
but at a reduced level of spending.  In 1959, Chamber spokesman William
C. Foster  (who was administrator of the  ECA in 1950-51) recommended that
the  administration do a better job of selling the aid program to the
American public, and that Congress cut the administration's budget
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request for military and economic aid.9  The Chamber's  1961 testimony
was  also rather unenthusiastic.  J. Warren Nystrom, Manager of the
Chamber's International Relations Department said that the Chamber had
"no policy on these expanded (foreign investment) guaranties.  In
general we would favor anything that might be done to encourage private
enterprise  to move overseas, but we want to take a careful look at  this
97
and find out whether this  is the correct approach."  He supported
multiyear.authorizations but just  two-year  (rather than 5 or more year)
appropriations. He also wanted cuts in virtually every category of aid.
26Another representative  of the Chamber was  Forrest D. Murden,
Associate Government relations councel  of the Standard Oil Company of
New Jersey. He said he agreed with a statement by Emilio G. Collado
(Director of Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey) which was:  "(I  do) not
think there is  any evidence that, in  the aggregate, U.S.  investment
abroad has  affected adversely the level  of investment and employment in
the United States. On the other hand, U.S. foreign investment helps
protect our  share of the world market and creates substantial employment
opportunities  in the U.S. by helping to maintain and increase  foreign
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demand for US goods."
The U.S.  Council of the  International Chamber of Commerce is  a
separate organization from the Chamber of Commerce  of the U.S.  In 1961
testimony, its  executive director, Lloyd Neidlinger, called for "maximum
use  of private foreign investment  in economic development programs" and
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liberalization of the investment guarantee system.  The Chamber
organizations  did not so much address the concept  of foreign aid (in
their testimony over the years), but as  long as  there would be an aid
program they wanted to  assure its being carried out by private
enterprise as much as possible.
The Citizens Foreign Aid Committee  (represented by an insurance
executive, head of a financial analysis firm, and a retired Brigadeer
General  in the US Army) testified before the Foreign Affairs Committee
in 1961.  The spokesmen seemed in  favor of Third World development and
technical assistance, but they were opposed to  the overall aid program.
They objected to the notion that foreign aid  (as a spending program)  is
good for  the U.S. economy. The fact that aid money is  spent on American
27goods  and services is  not of benefit to  the US economy they argued.  The
American people are  then deprived of those goods  and services,  though
"an equivalent amount of purchasing power is  not removed, with the
result that -the total effect  is  inflationary."  Regarding the development
of broader markets, they said that we never should have built our
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competition overseas.  Walter Harnischfeger, National Chairman of the
Citizens Foreign Aid Committee  gave a highly spirited anti-aid testimony
before the  Foreign Relations Committee.  He  submitted a statement  from
Mr. A.G. Heinsohn (manager of two cotton mills employing over 1,000) who
blamed foreign aid for substantial loss  of business in the  textile
industry to foreign competition. Heinsohn quoted Robert T. Stevens
(President of J.P. Stevens and Co.)  as saying that "textiles have
...been called upon to carry far too much of the  load of our foreign
policy."
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The Council  for International Progrssi in Management was represented
by a team of businessmen whom had taken leaves  of absence from their
companies  to  teach management techniques and to extoll the virtues of
free  enterprise in developing countries.  The council was funded partly
by the  International Cooperation Administration.  They generally,  did not
address  the aid bill under consideration, but  they did speak most
enthusiastically about the good that  technical assistance can do.  A. C.
Nielsen, Jr.,  President of the  A.C. Nielsen Corp.,  Chicago, gave three
reasons  for helping the developing countries:  "If they can use our
techniques  (and) produce more,  they can sell  these products  (raw
materials)  to us for  less money...they will be  good potential customers
for our exports..(and thirdly)..technical assistance strengthens their
28industrial capacity which in turn strengthens  their military
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capacity." 02 when asked what he  thought about foreign investment
guarantees, Austin S. Igleheart, retired Chairman of the Board, General
Foods Corporation, said,  "If we are not smart enough  to handle our own
funds  we certainly don't want Uncle Sam to stand behind us. 03
HUMANITARIAN MOTIVATIONS  IN
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE
In reference to  the period around 1961 when the development decade
was  launched, John Montgomery said, "Liberal idealism was  considered
good politics;  candidates could appeal to altruistic aspirations without
104
sounding hypocritical." 04  That may well have been the  case, but
altruism was  likely the least motivating factor in the  aid campaign.
President Kennedy became the inspirational  center of this  idealism
trend, yet he himself gave security concerns as  the primary purpose of
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an expanded aid program.  This  section of the paper will consider
just what role  (however minimal) altruism did play in  the formulation of
aid policy.
Representative  Barratt O'Hara (D. ILL) referred to the  days  of his
youth saying "people didn't have very much money, but they contributed
cheerfully for  the foreign missions...that money was used in the  foreign
lands not only to promote religion but as well  to  fight disease,  to
fight illiteracy, and do a  lot of things  that broadened life...what the
government is  doing now is  merely following  the pattern that the
29churches have set for us."  06   A number of religious  groups seemed to
share this view. 0
The very word, "aid,"  implies an altruistic motivation. Little and
Clifford noted the confusion surrounding the word in saying, "Buying
something from a man may help him, but one does not speak of 'aiding'
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him if-it  is  something one wants."  A  democratically elected
government is mandated to serve  the interests of its consituency, and if
"aid" precludes self-interest, then the  goverment would be violating  its
duty in giving the aid.  By common usage, the government calls its
program of giving, an "aid" program, though the program is  clearly
intended to  serve the interests of the United States.  The churches do
not necessarily have a mission of this kind of self-interest,  so  it is  a
rather precarious position to  say that government  is  following the
pattern set by the churches.  The motivations for giving may be very
different.
Presbyterian leader Clifford Earle, attempted to bridge the  gap
between church motives and government motives. He said, "We
recognize...that a government  and the  Congress have to act in  terms of
national interest, and we would remind ourselves and the American people
in whatever way we can that American interest  is  served when we help
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others to help themselves  in the way this program is  designed to do."
Baptist leader, W.G. Mather, had trouble seeing things the way Earle
did. He said, "I confess  to be a little disturbed by the beginning
statement of the  (aid) bill that it is  to  'promote the  foreign policy,
security, and general welfare of the US  (by) assisting peoples  of the
world."  Nevertheless, he did support the bill. While different
30church leaders may have had different levels of comfort with the  aid
program, throughout the decade  from 1951  to  1961, all  of the
representatives  of religious organizations who were called upon to
testify, did so  in favor of expanded aid programs.
The Americans  for Democratic Action, and the American Association of
University Women were also consistent aid supporters.  When pressed
sligh.tly on his  support of an aid program that may be used to support
unjust regimes  in certain countries, ADA official David Williams said,
"We do know that even popularly supported governments have  at times had
considerable trouble maintaining internal security against fanatical and
highly disciplined groups such as the communists have been able to
organize  in suitable territory."  He did not answer  the challenge.
In 1961  the League of Women Voters had already had a long history of
support for economic assistance, and in May of 1960  it was part of the
League's agenda to  "be working for community understanding and support
of economic developoment assistance, making this  a vital issue  in  the
forthcoming election.  League of Women Voters Director Barbara Stuhler
testified that  "...there  is probably no single subject of league concern
about which there is  greater unanimity than the  importance of our
foreign aid program."  When asked point blank whether the  league was
supporting  the program on its merits without regard to communism,
Stuhler replied,"I wouldn't want the  league  to appear that unrealistic,
if you don't mind.  I think you can argue for the program on its  own
merits, but we live  in a bipolar world where  the  struggle  is between
communism and democracy and you simply can't overlook the  impact of a
foreign aid program without considering this background of the struggle
31112
between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R."  Roberta Cox of the National
Congress of Parents and Teachers, testified in favor of the aid program
saying that members of her organization "consider communism a very
113
unhealthy idea.113
'Although  otherwise humanitarian organizations supported the aid
program, selfless humanitarianism did not seem to play a big role  in  the
debate during 1961 or  the decade preceeding it.  Even Rep O'Hara, who
made the  comparison of foreign aid to church deeds, was very much
involved in the  debate in  terms of how the U.S. would fare economically
under  the program.  He clearly felt that  the U.S. would come out
114
ahead.114
TRENDS  IN ACADEMIC THOUGHT ON DEVELOPMENT AID
FROM POINT FOUR TO THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT
Economists and political scientists wrote prolifically about economic
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development in the  1950s.  Two basic questions which they addressed
were:  "Do the economically advanced countries have  an interest in the
economic development of the less developed countries?" and  if so,  "hQw
should this assistance be made?"  By considering some of the seemingly
more  significant writings of the period, we will attempt to show that
32the  academic thinking changed from  support of development motivated by
economic, humanitarian and security interests  in the early 1950s  to
support due to  security (specifically anticommunist) concerns  in the
late  1950s  and early 1960s.
The answer to  the  second question of how to assist  in development
also  evolved during this period.  As first envisioned, development was
seen as a long process requiring many social and political changes and a
- 116
balanced growth of agriculture and industry.  In the mid 1950s  the
emphasis  on balance turned into a "big push", calling for rapid
advancement on all fronts with an emphasis on industry vs. agriculture.
Import substitution became a high priority.  By the early 1960s  there
was a return to emphasis on long term planning and a greater
appreciation of agriculture and other primary industries.  This plotting
of a -general  trend in  thinking is necessarily inexact and it  is  likely
that at any given moment supporters aid  ritics of all  of the  theories
could be  found.
The Question of Whether Third World Development is  Beneficial  to  the
U.S.
In the early 1950s  as reconstruction of Europe was nearing an end
and Truman had recently announced his point four initiative,  the UN
launched a study of how full employment might be  accomplished around the
world.  The West had an expanded appreciation for how interdependent the
countries of the world were.  The developed countries' prosperity was
seen as  dependent in part  on that  of the developing countries.  Nelson
Rockefeller wrote  that Truman's Point Four pronouncement placed this
33interest in  the well being of the world "squarely on economic
considerations."1 17  There was concern that in order  to have increasing
supplies of raw materials to feed the economic posperity, the developing
countries which supplied those materials would have to  share in the
prosperity.
An ill-defined sense of moral duty appeared in some of these writings
as the  advanced countries were said to have an obligation to help their
disadvantaged neighbors.  The desirabilty of economic development was
largely unquestioned. Gunnar Myrdal had described foreign aid as a sort
of international welfare system of redistribution of wealth and
equalization of opportunity.  When the Randall Commission declared in
1954 that the U.S. recognized no  "right of underdeveloped areas to
economic aid,"  Myrdal characterized  that statement as  "harsh." 18
Nurske,  in describing the US  foreign aid programs, said "it  may be that
we've seen the beginnings of a system of international  income
transfers."119  Bleloch tied welfare and economic considerations
together  in saying that  the development of the advanced countries
"depends on the extension of the concept of the welfare state to  cover
120 all  the economically significant portions of the earth's  surface." 120
The existence  of a moral call to help other countries to  develop would
be debated well  into the  1960s and probably into  the  indefinite future.
Two of the parties  to  the debate  in the early 1960's were Joseph
121  122
Cropsey  (pro) and Edwin Banfield  (con).
While security concerns had long been present in the foreign aid
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debate  ,  they reached a new height with the Korean War.  Millikan and
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Rostow's  famous Proposal  was based on a  1954 draft which stemmed from
34a meeting called to  discuss how the U.S. might facilitate a more stable
world and enhance  the U.S.  security against agression.  By 1957, Howard
Ellis  said that the  economic benefits of aid to the U.S. were nearly
125
insignificant; political considerations were  the justification.  Also
that year, Mason wrote  that security  interests were the prime motivation
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behind aid.  Writing in 1959  and 1960, Montgomery said that  "the
indefinite necessity for American aid occasioned by the continued
dynamic  of Communist expansionism and the revolutionary drive of the
economically underprivileged nations has revealed itself only
,,  127
gradually.27
The underlying theme  to the security argument  for economic
development  is  that economic development enables underdeveloped
countries  to choose the  democratic rather than totalitarian way of life;
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that is  then said to be  inherently in the U.S.  interest.1   Liska
phrased it:  "In giving aid to other countries,  the objective of the
United States  is  to promote its  short-range and long-range security
within the evolving structure of international relations and to help
129
preserve recipient countries  from other than peaceful change."  Wolff
said that economic growth would most greatly reduce  the  less developed
countries' vulnerablity to extremist political behavior  (defined as
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communism).  Stopping expansion of communism was  almost universally
accepted as being  in the U.S.  interest.  Banfield was one notable
exception to  that universality as he  regarded the friendship of other
131
countries  as relatively unimportant  to U.S.  security.
Wiggins was one who challenged the  alleged connection between
development and stability when he said in 1962  that  "it  is by no means
35assured  ...that an increase in  living standards will bring with it a
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political stability favorable  to American interests."  Hoselitz and
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Weiner suggested that development can lead to more violence  ; they
used India, Asia, Africa and Latin America as examples  of their
position.  These challenges were essentially made in the early 1960s.
From the  time of the Millikan/Rostow  "proposal" up  through 1961,  the-
security argument for economic development prevailed.  It might be noted
that during that time period the  "cold war" and McCarthyist
anitcommunism were dominant  forces.  If somebody liked economic
development for any reason, it may have been prudent for them to
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emphasize  the anticommunist one.
The Question of How to Help the Less Advanced Countries  to Develop
From Point Four  (1949) to  the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961,  there
was a body of literature  that did not specifically take a position on
the advisability of development, but that did offer suggestions  on how
to bring it about or  speed it up.  As noted in the  article by Kennedy
and Ruttan, some of the earliest writings of the period called for
unified, balanced programs, heavy emphasis of human resources, modest
steps  (rather than ambitious  ones) and well  thought out development
plans.  Special emphasis was  given to the need for "strenuous domestic
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efforts"  for any development plan to succeed.
Blelloch noted a general agreement  that development should be based
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on the  extraction of primary materials.  Industrialization was
secondarily encouraged to diversify the economy, to  create a consumer
36class, and to  facilitate urbanization (which was hoped to  lead to a fall
in  the birth rate).  At the  same  time Adler took a view which seemed to
137 dominate aid programs for years to  come.  He  called for a
modification of the extractive industry approach, noting that balanced
growth need be emphasized. Chenery would later say that development
programs  taking a longer view tended to  stress comparative advantage
138
over balance.  As security motivations grew to dominate  the aid
discussion, the view did become shorter and the push for balance did
overshadow comparative advantage.  The Point Four message clearly
emphasized technical assistance over capital assistance and that message
was reflected in  the early writings by Blelloch and Rockefeller.
In 1951,  the UN "Panel of Experts"  (on which Schultz  and Lewis
served) issued its report calling for massive capital  transfers along
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with the other measures.  More  than $10 billion of imported capital
would be needed annually to achieve  a 2% per capita income growth rate
in the developing countries.  The question of appropriate levels of
capital contributions  largely captivated the aid debate from that point
forward. Another big question was for how long capital  infusions would
be needed. Singer aknowledged that  the success of the Marshall Plan
meant very little for  the prospects of development, yet he did say that
"the injection of foreign capital  (into developing economies) could be
sufficiently short lived to  be discussed in terms of  'Marshall Plan
Time'."140  The U.N. report assumed a high degree of disguised
unemployment which required industrialization for its  elimination. The
industrialization would require external capital. Mason contended that
the theory behind large capital  intensive development projects resulted
37from the fact that they were the  easiest to carry out;  the  theory was
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effectively devised to justify the practice.
After the mid 1950s  the  assumption of disguised unemployment was
challenged increasingly. With the benefit of three years of directing
technical assistance studies in Latin America, Schultz  said in 1956  that
"economic thinking based on the two  central ideas-disguised unemployment
and industrialization-does not give us  even the beginning of a theory
142 for  the purposes at hand."14 2  Then in 1964, hesaid that the  theory of
143 zero marginal productivity in agricultural  labor was wrong.  He  said,
"there  is  no longer any room for doubt whether agriculture can be a
144 powerful engine  for growth."  This appears to be a significant shift
in emphasis  from the position held in the 1951 UN report of which he was
a coauthor.
Once the UN report opened up the possibilities of massive capital
transfers, a test of the big push the4rios  became possible.
Rosenstein-Rodan had illustrated the  theory in 1943 with his
hypothetical new isolated economy of 20,000 workers which would achieve
145 wealth by launching a full range of industries simultaneous.  Such a
plan for instantaneous growth fit well with the notion espoused by
Singer and Prebisch among others  that the terms  of trade were going
against primary producers and that  import substitution was needed.1
Kindledberger and Morgan further supported the  import substitution
approach in light of the adverse prices and income elasticities
147 associated with primary products.
Rosenstein-Rodan was a collaborator on the Millikan/Rostow proposal
which described three stages which developing countries must pass
38through. They are  as  follows:  "precondition stage"  (in which technical
assistance and some  grants should be given),  a "transition stage"
(wherein such countries would be given as much capital as  they could
absorb on favorable loan terms)  and the  stage of self-sustaining growth
(where the country's  access  to capital would be  on the  open market).
Technical assistance programs would be offered where needed to  give  the
recipient countries  the necessary capital absorptive capacity.  This
theory was the most prominent of the various aid theories for the  latter
half of the 1950s,  and was refined to consist of 5 stages in Rostow's
148 The  Stages of Economic Growth, published in  1960.  The theory had
plenty of critics, many challenging the assertion that the  two or three
149 decade long transition (take-off) stage  could be identified at all.1
The "take-off" and "big push"  theories were very similar  in  their
requirement of large  infusions of capital.  Another argument for
emphasizing capital projects came from Hirschman who submitted that
capital  intensive techniques provided an educational value in spreading
150
use of technical knowledge and skills.  It should be noted that
Hirschman was very critical of the big push, fearing that without the
necessary social and political development, a massive infrastructure of
social overhead projects would be built with little resultant output.
Galenson and Leibenstein regarded the most profitable projects to be
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those with the highest capital/labor ratios.  This,  they said,
indicated that capital intensive efforts should be preferred.
39
Beyond  the  Issue  of  CapitalBy 1961  as  the massive capital expenditure programs  finally were
underway, attention turned again to the social, political and economic
problems  as causes of underdevelopment.  J.P. Lewis asserted in 1962
that lack of outside capital was not the principal impediment to  rapid
152
expansion in production.  Galbraith said in 1961  that "it  is
doubtful  that many of us,  if pressed, would insist that economic
development was  simply a matter of external aid.  But nothing could be
more  convenient than to believe this,  for once we admit that it  is not
the case, we become entrapped in a succession of greviously complex
153
problems."  153 He noted a then present view that sufficient capital was
the primary missing ingredient  in economic development, but then went on
to say that literacy, social justice, reliable government and a clear
view of the development process were crucial requirements  to which we
must turn attention.
Raul Prebisch acknowledged a "growing conviction in Latin America
that...development has  to be brought about by our own efforts and our
own determination to  introduce fundamental changes  in the economic  and
social  structures of our countries."154  Prebisch also softened his view
on import substitution, writing that the need for it  "would not be quite
so acute if our countries could add industrial  exports  to their
traditional primary ones which tend to grow slowly."15 5  Paul Hoffman
said, "we have acquired experience during the 1950s  and can profit from
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past mistakes."  "Inadequate attention,"  he said, had been given to
"investment in education, technical training and survey resources."
40CONCLUSION
Academic thought, humanitarian instinct, economic self-interest,  and
'the Cold War were highly interrelated in the years  leading up  to 1961.
The political process was  the medium in which these forces interacted to
produce the economic development assistance policies which emerged out
of Washington that year.
Development assistance,  as  an academic discipline, grew in popularity
at a time when technology was  effectively shrinking the world,
colonialism was  ending and many changes in  the Third World appeared
inevitable.  When this enthusiasm combined with the many political calls
for anticommunist strategies,  it  is  not surprising  that academia
produced blueprints  for  security related development assistance.
The government's development assistance initiatives  from the mid
1950s up  to  1961 drew largely from academia. The Congresses and the
Administrations repeatedly called on CENIS,  the National Planning
Association and other  institutions for policy recommendations.
By 1961  the foreign aid program had become a more or less  accepted
element of U.S.  foreign policy.  Congress'  (less than enthusiastic)
acceptance, however, was not without a great deal of continuous debate
over the  specific programs  and dollar amounts. Increases  in the  aid
funds  or  in the Administration's control of  those  funds required an
extra measure of argument, and in 1961  the program's proponents elicited
or  inspired supportive argument from-not just the  security lobby, but
also from humanitarian, public interest, labor, and even partly business
organizations.  President Kennedy engaged in a major public relations
41campaign to win support for this  aid program among the people of the
United  States.
The program that became law in 1961 was mostly contained in the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Senate Bill, 1983.  The Act authorized
the President to replace  the International Cooperation Administration
with a new Agency for International Development which would be directed
by an administrator with rank equivalent  to that of an Under Secretary.
The emphasis of the program was declared to be on long range assistance
to promote economic and social development.  Recipients would be
required to take  self-help measures  to reform and develop  social and
economic institutions.
A new Development Loan Fund was  initiated and the President was
authorized to commit to  development loans  (subject to appropriation) of
$1.2 billion in fiscal year  1962 and $1.5 billion per year for  the
following four years. The authority to commit for  future years was very
significant and it had not previously been given for foreign aid
matters. The President was  further authorized to make development grants
of $380 million in fiscal 1962.
Congress authorized guarantees  for up to $1 billion of investments by
U.S. citizens  or business entities where  the investments would promote
social improvements  in underdeveloped areas. A $62 billion subscription
payment was paid to the.  International Development Association and $110
million was  invested in the  relatively new Inter-American Development
Bank.
There were also a number of initiatives not embodied in the  Foreign
Assistance Act. The Senate ratified U.S. participation in the
42Organization for Economic  Cooperation and Development  (OECD).  The
President used an executive  order to establish the Peace Corps which was
then given permanent status by Congress.  Its first year appropriation
was $30 million.
The Alliance  for Progress  commenced formally on August 17,  1961 when
the U.S. signed the Charter  of Punta del  Este  (Uruguay) in which the
U.S.  committed to helping finance a ten year  ,  $20 billion development
program throughout Latin America.  The PL 480 agricultural surplus
program was  expanded to authorize  1961 foreign currency sales  to
increase by $2 billion and the program was extended for  three years at
the  rate of $1.5  billion in sales  and'$300 million in gifts each year.
Dollar appropriations  reached a post Marshall Plan high in  1961, but
the more important feature of the development assistance program at  that
time was  the attitude with which the money would be spent. After years
of attempting to identify a philosophy for  the foreign aid program,
Congress  spelled one  out with uncharacteristic legibility.
Aid would be designed to  result in better lives  for  the masses of
poor  in developing countries  so  that they would then be  less  likely to
look to communism for relief.  In order for the program to work, it would
have  to be  substantial, consistent  over a long term, and with no  strings
attached except  that the  recipient governments would need to carry out
the  social, political,  and economic reforms necessary for self-
sustaining growth to be possible.  By assisting the recipients to
develop  into nations of self-determined and self-supporting people,  the
U.S.  could enjoy the kind of world neighborhood that would afford the
greatest security and wealth for all  its members.
43This philosophy was untested,  it clearly lacked uanimous  support, and
it was  fully expected to be very difficult to practice.  In this  light,
1961 could be viewed, not so much as  a year of culmination in economic
development assistance, but rather as  a  new base on which to build the
next  round  of  debate.
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